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Miller v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 (04/28/05)1
Daniel v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 11 (04/28/05)
CRIMINAL LAW - ENTRAPMENT
Summary
Both Miller and Daniel arise out of a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD) decoy program designed to combat an increase in street-level robberies occurring in
downtown Las Vegas.
In Miller, a detective with the LVMPD disguised himself as an intoxicated vagrant and
carried exposed cash in his pocket. The detective then positioned himself across from a bus
station and leaned against a chain link fence. Richard Miller, an individual walking down the
street, approached the detective and asked him for money. When the detective refused, Miller
pulled the detective closer to him and took the cash from the detective’s pocket.
In Daniel, the same detective carried a wallet in his pocket that also exposed cash. Rufas
Daniel approached the detective and showed him a silver charm necklace, which the detective
refused to look at. Daniel then pushed the necklace into the detective’s face and grabbed the
wallet out of the detective’s pocket.
Miller and Daniel argued that police officers entrapped them by improperly tempting
them with exposed money and a helpless victim. The court held that both Miller and Daniel were
not entrapped because they were predisposed to commit the crime. The court reasoned that since
the entrapment defense was designed to prevent police misconduct, evidence must be
demonstrated that the State presented the opportunity to commit a crime and that the defendant
was not otherwise predisposed to commit the crime. In both cases, the defendants were found to
be predisposed to commit the crime because they initiated contact with the detective and
engaged in the robbery or larceny for profit. Further, neither defendant demonstrated reluctance
which was overcome by the government’s inducement. Since the defendants were predisposed to
commit the crime, entrapment was not available as a defense.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Does a police operation involving a detective disguised as an intoxicated vagrant and
carrying cash exposed from his pocket constitute entrapment?
Disposition
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the entrapment defense is only available upon a
showing that (1) the state presented the opportunity to commit a crime, and (2) the defendant
was not otherwise predisposed to commit the crime. Predisposition is determined by examining
factors such as the defendant’s character, who first suggested the criminal activity, whether the
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defendant engaged in the activity for profit, whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance, and
the nature of the government’s inducement. The most important factor is whether the defendant
demonstrated reluctance which was overcome by the government’s inducement. If, considering
these factors, the defendant is found to be predisposed to commit the crime, the defense of
entrapment is unavailable.
Commentary
State of the Law Before Miller and Daniel
Previously, it was held that when police officers target a specific individual for an
undercover operation, they must have reasonable cause that the individual is predisposed to
commit the crime.2 Further, the furnishing of an opportunity for criminal conduct must be
presented to one with the requisite criminal intent.3 The Court in Shrader found that an
individual was entrapped when there was no evidence that the individual was predisposed to sell
marijuana before he was targeted for an undercover operation. 4
Miller and Daniel overruled this notion and stated that predisposition can be established
by examining factors such as (1) the defendant’s character, ( 2) who first suggested the criminal
activity, (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit, (4) whether the defendant
demonstrated reluctance, and (5) the nature of the government’s inducement. The most important
factor is whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance which was overcome by the
government’s inducement. Thus, the Court in Miller and Daniel abolished the previous standard
for entrapment, which required officers to have reasonable cause that the targeted individual is
predisposed prior to conducting an undercover operation. The new standard establishes that the
entrapment defense is not available for defendants who demonstrated a predisposition to commit
the crime based on the above factors.
Other Jurisdictions
The United States Supreme Court has held that where the government has induced an
individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to
first being approached by government agents.5
Among the states, there are two predominant approaches to the entrapment defense. The
majority of states have taken the subjective approach, focusing on the actions of the accused and
particularly, the predisposition of the accused to engage in the crime charged. The minority of
states take the objective approach, focusing on the actions of law enforcement and barring overinvolvement in inciting criminal activity.6
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Effect of Miller and Daniel on Current Law
Current law holds that a defendant is entrapped when the undercover decoy is apparently
helpless, intoxicated, and feigns unconsciousness with cash hanging from his pocket.7 In
DePasquale, the Court held that a defendant was not entrapped when he stole from a female
undercover police officer who was walking along open sidewalks around a casino with money
zipped into her purse. The Court found, however, that when the aforementioned factors are
present, entrapment is available as a defense. Id.
Miller and Daniel seem to apply strictly the standard established in DePasquale. In
Miller and Daniel, the Court found that the DePasquale standard did not apply because the
detective’s money was not readily accessible since only the tips of the detective’s currency was
exposed. The Court concluded that the entrapment defense was not available to the defendants
because the factors established in DePasquale were not present. Miller and Daniel represent the
Court’s unwillingness to permit entrapment as a defense and the requirement of strict adherence
to the DePasquale factors in order to establish a valid defense of entrapment.
Unanswered Questions
While the Court in Miller explicitly stated that it was overruling Shrader, the Court failed
to specify its reasoning for overruling Shrader. While the Miller Court offers an alternative
standard to determine whether one is predisposed to commit a crime, the Court fails to mention
the standard established in Shrader, that evidence of predisposition must be present before the
undercover operation takes place. This poses the question of whether the pre-operation
knowledge of predisposition is significant and whether it must still be considered relevant to
determine whether the defendant was entrapped. It seems as though the Court in Miller and
Daniel stray away from the significance of pre-operation knowledge of whether a defendant is
predisposed to commit the crime and lean towards the importance of the external factors such as
the defendant’s character to determine predisposition. However, without an express
manifestation that police no longer need reasonable cause that the defendant is predisposed
before the undercover operation takes place, it is difficult to ascertain whether future courts will
follow the holdings in Miller and Daniel or revert back to the position in Shrader.
Conclusion
The Court in Miller and Daniel concluded that since the defendants were predisposed to
commit the crime, they were not entrapped by the detective’s disguise and exposed money.
Evidence that defendants initiated contact with the detective, engaged in the robbery or larceny
for a profit, and failed to demonstrate reluctance that was overcome by the government’s
inducement further supports the notion that defendants were predisposed to commit robbery or
larceny and were not entrapped to commit the crimes.
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